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Abstract 
This paper studies the interaction of political institutions, government policies, and the economic 
performance in a developing country. The focus is on Turkey's economic history and the 
"paradox of Turkish liberalism". Except during the periods of war and post-war recovery, the 
fastest long-lasting growth episodes (1929-39 and 1961-77) have occurred under inward- 
looking, public-sector-oriented economic policies, while the episodes of slower and unstable 
growth (1951-60 and 1981-1991) have been associated with liberal, market-oriented policies 
typically considered more efficient by econmists. It is argued that the main factor underpinning 
this outcome is the evolution of political institutions that inreased the government's commitment 
to its policies during the high-growth periods. During the other two periods, the potential 
efficiency of policies introduced by the government was seriously undermined by lack of 
commitment. Commitment was achieved in the first high-growth period by constraining 
political competition under a single-party rule, and in the second one by diffusing power, 
creating many veto filters on policy change, and introducing a comprehensive planning system. 
Although successful for well over a decade, neither mechanism was sustainable in the long run. 
Lack of long-run stability under these regimes and weakness of commitment under the other 
two acted as an engine of institutional change in Turkey. The results imply that striking a 
balance between commitment and flexibility in policymaking tends to be a more difficult 
problem in countries with a weak private sector and may act as an important factor behind 
institutional dynamics. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies the interaction of political institutions, government policies, and economic 
performance in a developing country. The focus is on Turkey's economic history. The discussion 
is organized by seeking an explanation for "the paradox of Turkish liberalism:"' Except during 
periods of war and post-war recovery, the fastest long-lasting growth episodes (1929-39 and 
1961-77) have occurred under inward-looking, public-sector-oriented economic policies, while the 
episodes of slower and unstable growth (1951-60 and 1981-1991) have been associated with 
liberal, market-oriented policies, typically considered more efficient by economists. We argue 
that the main factor underpinning this outcome is the evolution of political institutions that 
increased the government's commitment to its policies during the high-growth periods. During the 
other two periods, the potential efficiency of policies introduced by the government was 
seriously undermined by an inability to commit, especially in the face of electoral cycles. 
Commitment was achieved in the first high-growth period by strongly curbing political 
competition under a single-party rule, and in the second one by diffusing power, creating many 
veto filters on policy change, and introducing a comprehensive planning system. Both of these 
institutional setups were conducive to robust economic performance in the medium run, but 
could not be sustained in the long run. The 1929-39 episode was aborted due to the events 
surrounding World War II and the growing demand for democratization. The 1961-77 experience 
came to an end because the combination of institutions and policies had rendered the system too 
rigid to respond to major shifts in the economy's parameters. Lack of long-run sustainability 
under these regimes and weakness of economic performance under the other two acted as the 
engine of institutional change in Turkey. 
Sustained long-run growth requires commitment to policies that reward investment and 
productivity, but allow those rewards to respond to changing supply and demand conditions. 
While there is a variety of institutional mechanisms that provide commitment across societies and 
over time, successful countries generally seem to have been able to combine such mechanisms 
with policies that extensively rely on the private sector.2 However, when the experience of a 
modern private sector in the country is limited and extensive involvement of foreign investors is 
not an option, such a combination may be slow to materialize because it takes time for the 
This terminology is borrowed from Bugra (1994: 120). She dubs the failure the pro-market and pro-business 
governments of the 1950s and 1980s to stimulate private investment as "the paradox of Turkish liberalism." 
This is, for example, what Korea and Chile have done. In both countries, under authoritarian rule the political 
leadership had a long-term horizon and could develop a "self-enforcing implicit contract" with the private sector. 
This served as a flexible commitment mechanism. After transition to more democratic rule, each country has 
instituted some form of institutional commitment. Korea established a dominant ruling party that can take a long- 
term view in its policy making. In Chile, the outgoing authoritarian rulers established widespread share 
ownership in the economy to create popular support for a market economy and designed the institutions of the 
upcoming democracy in ways to ensure that power would remain highly decentralized. The two institutions, 
which reinforced each other and generated a form of flexible policy commitment, were partly intended to prevent 
the emergence of concentrated political or economic powers that might have challenged the military privileged 
position. For a more detailed discussion on these international comparisons, see Campos and Esfahani (1995). 
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private sector to build its assets, entrepreneurial skills, and institutions. As in other 
underdeveloped countries, this was the case in Turkey at the time of its birth and the experiments 
with alternative institutions and policies partly reflect the country's attempts to find substitutes 
while the private sector develops. Some of these formations worked better than others, but none 
was a long-term solution. Understanding the causes of the rise and decline of such formations can 
help improve the design of institutions and policies in other countries in comparable situations. 
Similar lessons can be also be found in the experiences of other countries. The Turkish case is 
interesting because it contains a number of different institutional formations that have run their 
course in the same country. 
The idea that the weakness of constraints on policy change may give rise to a "time- 
inconsistency" problem on the part of the government and adversely affect economic 
performance is an old one (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). Also, the fact that electoral cycles 
exacerbate the problem is well understood (Alesina, 1994). In fact, both ideas are important 
themes in recent studies of economic policy in Turkey (e.g., Atiyas, 1994; Bugra, 1994; Onis and 
Webb, 1994; and Waterbury, 1993). What is new in this paper is the analysis of institutional 
mechanisms that help mitigate the problem, the limitations of such mechanisms when the private 
sector is weak, and the institutional changes induced by such limitations. The literature on the 
political economy of policy reform has paid attention to these issues, but mostly in the context 
of factors that delay policy reform.3 This paper is concerned with the determinants of policy 
success and failure in a broader context which sheds further light on the causes of delay in reform 
as well as their dynamic links with institutional change and economic performance. For the 
Turkish case, the paper offers a unified explanation for the past trends in economic policies and 
outcomes, with important implications for the possible future path of the economy as the 
country's institutional structure evolves. 
The analytical approach of this paper is a new institutionalist one akin to the framework outlined 
by North (1990).4 We posit that economic policies act as contracts between the government and 
economic agents to address perceived market imperfections or redistribution demands. Thus, 
policies can reach higher efficiency and lead to better economic performance when the 
government faces less contracting problems. That is, if it can commit to the incentives that it 
offers and collect information about the conditions of investment and production at low cost. 
The capabilities to commit and to collect information, in turn, depend on the society's 
institutions (i.e., formal and informal rules that structure human interactions). Hence, although 
economic performance depends on policy, its roots must be tracked to institutions. The 
institutional setup itself is subject to change as a result of movements in system parameters and 
performance. Dynamic shifts in resource scarcities, tastes, and technology induce changes in 
economic organizations in general, and economic policy in particular. Since policy and 
organizational change are constrained by institutions, parameter and performance variations can 
3 For recent surveys of this literature, see Alesina (1994) and the introduction to Haggard and Webb (1994). 
4 For a survey of methodology and a collection of empirical works in new institutional economics see Alston et at. 
(1996). 
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reveal the limitations of the existing institutions and encourage social and political entrepreneurs 
to seek institutional change. Because this process of change depends on the existing institutions, 
organizations, and beliefs within the society, the outcome may solve some immediate problems 
but may not necessarily result in institutions that allow efficient policies and organizations to 
take shape. 
Analysis of policy efficiency obviously requires some measure of dynamic economic efficiency. 
Since direct measures of economic efficiency are not available, we use per capita GDP growth 
rate, investment-GDP ratio, and the rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth as proxies.5 
These variables are closely related to economic efficiency in less developed countries because 
capital, skills, and technology are scarce in these countries and, therefore, a low investment rate 
or a slow growth indicates that the country is not attracting and employing economic resources 
efficiently. 
The next section develops the analytical framework of the paper and summarizes the arguments. 
Sections 3 through 8 analyze the main historical episodes in the Turkish economy and relate 
economic performance to institutional characteristics. Section 9 contains some concluding 
remarks. 
2. THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
To make the analysis manageable, it is convenient to partition the participants in an economy 
into three main groups: (1) the political elite, who comprise the individuals with skills and 
connections necessary to run the government; (2) the economic elite, i.e., entrepreneurs with the 
skills, resources, and connections necessary to identify investment opportunities and direct 
significant productive enterprises; (3) the non-elite, including peasants, workers, and the middle 
class, who may be professionally skilled, but do not control major resources or networks. Each 
group may consist of subgroups with special interests. The economic elite and the non-elite 
receive payoffs based on the returns to their assets and redistributions effected by the 
government. The politicians' payoff depends on the resources and the support they receive from 
the other groups to maintain a position of power. The government's role is to make rules and take 
actions that help resolve coordination and redistribution problems among the participants in the 
economy. The efficiency of economic policies depends on the politicians' access to information, 
their incentive to formulate long-term policies, and their ability to enforce policies adopted by the 
government. These in turn depend on rules and mechanisms that facilitate transmission of 
information and constrain the actions of the participants, including those in control of the 
government. Such rules and mechanisms may be based on formal institutions or informal 
relationships between politicians and other groups.6 
5 In this paper, TFP growth is measured as the residual GDP growth unaccounted for by the increases in the stock of 
capital and the number of workers. More refined measures of TFP growth are not available. 
6 Formal policy constraints are based on explicit (usually written) rules that vest certain veto powers in individuals 
or groups in control of designated positions. Informal constraints are "implicit contracts" between the government 
leaders and various interest groups, which are maintained by the value of cooperation. 
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To direct the economy, the political elite choose a level of intervention ranging from extensive 
reliance on private transactions to widespread control of production and exchange. The advantage 
of a private economy is decentralized decision making and efficient information processing, 
except when there is a serious market failure. But, due to interest group demands, politicians have 
an incentive to intervene and redistribute. As a result, successful operation of a private economy 
depends on confidence among private agents that government interventions remain limited and 
predictable. Government-controlled markets and enterprises do not demand the same level of 
trust, but they require centralized information processing and decision-making. This may not 
cause much resource waste when the government bureaucracy is effective and its control is 
limited to a few enterprises and markets or when the economy is primitive and does not entail a 
great deal of specialized exchanges. But, efficiency loss can be significant when controls 
proliferate and the economy is complex. In particular, the informational burdens of the large 
bureaucracy needed to run a centralized system forces the government to use rigid, across-the- 
board operation rules (e.g., with respect to prices, procurement, wages, and personnel 
management) rather than allowing decisions respond to specific circumstances. 
The incentives of politicians in charge of the government to formulate and implement efficient 
policies depends largely on their time horizon in office, their relationships with other groups, and 
institutional constraints on their behavior. The ruling subgroup of politicians (e.g., political party 
or clique) has an incentive to focus on policies with short-term payoffs if it expects to lose 
power in the near future through legal or illegal means and has little chance of returning to power 
or remaining influential in the government. Such a focus may not necessarily be due to 
opportunism and lack of integrity among politicians. They tend to act in this way if they expect 
others who succeed them to reverse the policies initiated at present. However, the ruling 
politicians may be persuaded to launch long-term policies and go along with pre-existing ones if 
the institutional structure makes policy change costly; e.g., when policy change requires costly 
coalition building across different interest groups (Shepsle, 1991). Thus, when the probability of 
regime turnover is high, the economy is likely to suffer if institutional constraints on policy 
change are weak.8 When institutions restrict policy discretion, the economy may perform well, 
especially if the initial policies support the development of a flexible economy. This is in fact the 
way successful democracies maintain policy stability while keeping the political leadership 
positions contestable. 
The incentive of politicians to consider more efficient, long-term policies improves when they 
expect to rule for a long time or have a good chance of remaining influential and regaining power in 
the near future. This is the case when a single party dominates the politics of the country and 
political competition for the control of the government is restricted. The long-term horizon of the 
ruling elite in such a situation does not automatically translate into efficient policies because 
7 Former centrally planned economies are prime examples of such inefficiency. 
8 By turnover in the government, in this paper, we mean replacement of a political team controlling the government 
by another one with different orientation and ties to individual interest groups. 
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political leaders may not be competent managers of the economy or may not trust that other 
groups,, respond to policy incentives appropriately. For example, when private investors are 
suspicious that a dictator may expropriate them, policy incentives can hardly induce investment 
in the country and the dictator may not offer incentives for private sector development in the 
first place. Also, the absence of a significant private sector and lack of understanding or 
experience with the operation modes of a private economy may lead to extensive government 
intervention and reliance on public enterprises. 
Political institutions are themselves subject to change depending on the performance of the 
conditions and performance of the economic and political systems. Demand for institutional 
change increases among interest groups when an alternative institutional setup offers prospects 
of better economic performance or more effective resolution of interest group conflicts. But, 
transforming institutions is costly because it requires a great deal of coordination among interest 
groups, by consent or by force. As a result, the likelihood of institutional change increases when 
the demand grows high because of poor performance of the economy or systematic failure of 
conflict resolution mechanisms. When change does occur, the new institutions are likely to 
address the failures of the previous institutional setup subject to the constraints imposed by the 
relative power of various interest groups, their beliefs and "mental images," and the economy's 
resources (Alston et al., forthcoming). For example, when institutional change occurs in a 
situation where opportunistic use of policy discretion has seriously impeded saving and 
investment, the new institutions are likely to impose stronger constraints on the government's 
actions (North and Weingast, 1989). This may be combined with restricting government 
intervention in the economy if those who are influential in the design of the new system believe 
that the private sector can operate the economy efficiently and find the outcome in their interest. 
On the other hand, constraints on policy may be combined with extensive government controls 
over assets and markets if the designers lack confidence in the capability of the private sector or 
view restricting intervention detrimental to their interests. 
In our analysis of institutions and economic performance in Turkey, we focus on various 
episodes of institutional change. For each episode, we take as given the initial political and 
economic conditions as well as the social and cultural parameters that determine the informal 
relationships within and among various groups. We argue that these conditions were conducive to 
the formation of observed institutional structures and policies, which entailed the economy's 
actual performance as their likely outcome. 9 
3. INITIAL CONDITIONS 
Modern Turkey emerged after World War I out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman 
power had been on the decline for three centuries. The Empire had faced changes in its position in 
the world economic and political system, but its highly bureaucratic system of governance had 
been slow to respond (Keyder, 1987). While the Ottomans were fighting increasingly costly 
9 The main macroeconomic data for the periods discussed in the paper are summarized in Table 1. 
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internal and external wars, their sources of revenue were stagnant or shrinking. Until the early 
19th century, heavy reliance of the rulers on the bureaucracy and the army had prevented the rise 
of any source of political or economic power outside the central government (Frey, 1975; 
Mardin, 1980). At the same time, bureaucratic control over economic resources and activities had 
left little incentive for investment and economic expansion (Mardin, 1980). During the 19th 
century, the Ottoman elite made a number of attempts to solve the Empire's political and 
economic problems and halt its decline. However, the solutions they sought were essentially 
bureaucratic reforms, most of which proved to be failures. Meanwhile, the Ottomans had become 
vulnerable to European pressure and, as part of the reform programs, the government established 
very liberal foreign trade and investment regimes, with special privileges granted to foreigners. 
British and French capital took key positions in the economy, including the control of the 
Ottoman Bank, which acted as the central bank and issued currency (Keyder, 1987: 64). 
Although the liberal trade and investment measures did not help the finances of the central 
government, they gave rise to an expansion of agricultural production, a greater security of 
private property, and involvement of foreigners in domestic commerce, banking, and 
infrastructure. These developments particularly benefited Levantine minorities (mainly 
Armenians, Greeks, and Jews which comprised about 20% of the population) and some Ottoman 
notables who resided along the seaports of the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Seas and had 
links to businesses in Europe (Bugra, 1994: 36-37). In the rest of the Empire also local notables 
gained greater independence, but those areas did not experience much economic development 
(Mardin, 1980). In Anatolia and Istanbul, the heartland of the Empire and the geographic location 
of modern Turkey, this process exacerbated the ethnic division of labor between Levantine 
minorities and the Turkish majority. While the elite of minority groups prospered in trade and 
commercial agriculture, the Turkish elite either became large landowners and tax farmers or joined 
the Empire's main pillars of power---the bureaucracy, the army, and the religious hierarchy. 
In 1908-1909, a group of army officers and bureaucrats, known as the Young Turks, deposed the 
ruling Ottoman Sultan and transformed the Empire into a multi-ethnic and multi-party 
constitutional monarchy. The Ottoman government under the Young Turks took a more 
developmentalist stance. Private investment was encouraged through an 11 % tariff on all imports 
except production equipment and machinery (Hansen, 1992: 301). The government also began 
to actively invest in industry. Although the Young Turks followed the Ottoman tradition of 
reliance on the bureaucracy, they were aware of the past bureaucratic reform failures and sought 
to build a local capitalist class (Mardin, 1980). Some army officers, ex-bureaucrats, and 
individuals closely related to the Young Turks took advantage of the incentives provided by the 
government and started new businesses, often in partnership with the state (Bugra, 1994: 40-41). 
These developments were aborted by the advent of World War I, in which the Ottoman 
government was dragged in on the side of the Central Powers. 
The ascent of the Young Turks in 1908 reflected the disappointment of the elite with the 
Empire's Ottoman-Islamic traditions and the spread of a belief in institutional Westernization as a 
means of saving the Empire. However, once in power, Young Turks could not keep their 
promises of equality among all ethnic groups and increasingly turned to Turkish nationalism. As 
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a result, separatist movements in various corners of the Empire found fertile grounds and were 
readily exploited by Western powers to disintegrate the system. This process accelerated with 
the start of World War I and, before long, even Anatolia was being partitioned by victorious 
Western powers. In response, a group of high ranking army officers and bureaucrats who had 
their roots in the Young Turks movement joined forces with Anatolian landowning local notables 
and formed a Turkish nationalist front to save the heartland of the empire as their homeland 
(Turan, 1984). This front, which came to be known as the Republican People's Party (RPP), 
established Turkey as a new nation after successfully fighting a war against Greece that had 
invaded parts of Anatolia with backing from Western powers. 
World War I and the Graeco-Turkish War had four important consequences for the future of 
Turkey. First, the resentment developed over the previous century against the involvement of 
foreigners in the country was accentuated. This seriously inhibited the potential participation of 
foreign investor in the development of the economy for many decades. More importantly, in the 
process of these wars and their aftermath, the Armenian and Greek minorities who sympathized 
with the Western powers and invading Greek forces were largely expelled and purged from the 
country.10 Since these minorities controlled most of the commercial activities in Anatolia, their 
departure left a great vacuum in the economy. This vacuum was partially filled by the Turkish 
population expelled from the Balkans in a process mirroring that in Anatolia. However, the loss 
of commercial skills and networks was substantial. In addition, the two wars destroyed a great 
deal of the country's infrastructure and productive assets. 
Second, to end the Graeco-Turkish War, the RPP signed a treaty with the Western Powers in 
Lausanne in 1923. In this treaty, the newly established government of Turkey gained recognition 
from Western powers in exchange for guarantees of protection for a variety of Western interests 
in the country until 1929. In particular, the Turkish economy was to remain open to foreign trade 
and investment and, moreover, the concessions and monopolies granted to foreigners by the 
Ottoman government had to be maintained. The treaty constrained the economic policy options 
of the Turkish government for some time, but assured the participation of foreign capital in the 
Turkish economy during the 1920s. This helped partially replace the capital and networks lost 
due to the departure of minorities. 
Third, the political and economic weakness of the landowners and the exigencies of the war gave 
the military and bureaucratic leaders of the RPP a natural advantage over their coalition partners. 
As a result, those leaders came to form the political elite of the country and dominate the 
government. Even among the elite, the power structure took a military-bureaucratic form, with an 
army general, Mustafa Kemal (Atattirk), assuming undisputed leadership (Frey, 1975). The 
landowners only managed to secure the protection of their local interests. This protection was 
institutionalized in Turkey's 1924 constitution by vesting all powers in a parliament, the Grand 
National Assembly, where the members of the nationalist coalition could be represented. 
10 The share of Levantine minorities in Turkey's population declined from about 20% before World War I to only 
about 2% in 1927 (Hansen, 1992: 295). 
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However, the electoral system was designed multi-tiered and indirect so that only the members of 
the military and bureaucracy and the local elite approved by the RPP leaders could join the 
Assembly (Ahmad, 1976: 3).11 Since the Assembly chose the executive officers, the RPP leaders 
in effect concentrated all government powers in their own hands. The only check on their power 
was the provision that the Assembly could not be dismissed. Only the Assembly could call for 
early elections before the end of its four year term. After each elections, the Assembly would 
elect a president to serve a concurrent term as the head of the government. The president would 
then appoint a chief executive officer, the prime minister, who would form a cabinet and stand 
responsible to the Assembly. Until the introduction of competitive politics in the late 1940s, the 
presidency was the most powerful office in this system. 
Aside from the events surrounding the Graeco-Turkish War, a key characteristic of the Turkish 
society played an important role in the formation of an authoritarian state in the early decades of 
the republic. The dominance of bureaucracy in the Ottoman Empire gave the state a patrimonial 
role in society (Heper, 1985). This implied that the political elite considered themselves above 
the society and distinct, and maintained entry into their ranks restricted through a variety of 
formal and informal rule. These restrictions were justified largely by the belief that "national 
interests," as defined by the existing political elite, could be jeopardized by open political 
competition in an "uneducated" society (Frey, 1975). This cultural feature facilitated erection of 
strong limits on the negotiation and bargaining of interest groups with the leadership and helped 
power become highly concentrated. 
Thus, by 1924, Turkey's political elite had established a constitutional government with an 
authoritarian character in which their main (junior) partners were the landowning local notables of 
the country. At the time, Turkey lacked a domestic economic elite experienced in industry and 
services to develop those sectors. In view of the historical relations between the Ottoman 
Empire and Western powers, the political elite were also reluctant to depend on foreign capital, 
even though foreigners had invested in Turkey and continued to maintain their interests. 
Naturally, the political elite had to largely rely on the bureaucracy to develop the economy and to 
deliver the goods justifying their rule. The hope was that at a later date an enterprising private 
sector would emerge and take over the task (Turan, 1984). 
4. POLICY STABILITY UNDER SINGLE-PARTY RULE, 1923-1939 
The events in Turkey during the first two decades of the Republic present examples of the 
potential flexibility and effectiveness of economic policy under typical conditions in an 
underdeveloped economy when the institutional setup concentrates power but there is continuity 
in the government. The events also show that in this situation, given the lack of commitment 
mechanisms, many policy inefficiencies are related to the weaknesses of the private sector and 
The constitution did not require that Assembly members to belong to (i.e., be born or live in) the districts they 
represented. The Assembly candidates were typically determined by the RPP leadership from among party 
activists and bureaucrats (Frey, 1975). 
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strains in its relationship with the political elite. Finally, they show the limits to the benefits of 
leadership continuity when conditions change sharply and there are no institutional constraints 
on policy. 
Immediately after establishing the Republic, RPP leaders focused their attention on consolidating 
their power by dismantling all remnants of Ottoman institutions, especially those serving as 
power bases for the religious establishment. Through the control of the Grand National 
Assembly and the electoral process, they also undermined any actual or potential opposition to 
the RPP rule. In the course of these activities, the political elite strengthened the bureaucracy, 
fused it with the RPP, and turned it into their main base of power. Bureaucratic control was 
imposed on many aspects of life in Turkey, and interest group representation was effectively 
curtailed. Interest group associations were either outlawed (e.g., labor unions) or were required by 
law to become extensions of the bureaucracy where ministries appointed the top officials (e.g., 
chambers of commerce).12 The political system took a dictatorial form in which Ataturk and a 
few of his associates exercised a great deal of power through the RPP and the bureaucracy. 
Ataturk was elected as the first president of the Republic and remained in that position until his 
death in 1938. At that point Atati rk's position was passed on to his old-time first lieutenant, 
Ismet Inonii, who led the RPP until 1972 and served as the president of the Republic until 1950. 
Although the political elite maintained their alliance with the local notables, they could not rely 
on the notables as an economic elite to develop the industrial and service sectors of the economy. 
Thus, they began to invest and develop the economy with the help of the bureaucracy, while 
supporting the private sector and planning to ultimately hand over business management to the 
economic elite that was expected to emerge from the process. The commitment to the 
development of a private enterprise economy was reflected in the principles adopted by a 
National Economic Congress organized in 1923, which brought together the representatives of 
merchants, industrialists, farmers, and workers (Bugra, 1994: 98). It was also evident in the 
establishment of the Is Bank in 1924 to encourage private investment in a variety of industrial 
and commercial activities. The Is Bank was initiated as a private corporation in which the 
government participated and many among the political elite, including Ataturk, took a personal 
interest (Hershlag, 1968: 126). Even state-owned financial institutions such as the Bank for 
Industry and Mines which were in charge of managing the existing public enterprises, 
participated in a variety of privately-owned firms (Hershlag, 1968: 91). The vision behind these 
policies was that a high industrial concentration and close ties between big, modern firms and the 
state were crucial characteristics of successful Western economies and needed to be reincarnated 
in Turkey (Bugra, 1991). Such an approach seems to have fitted Turkey's institutional conditions 
quite well. The country had inherited a problem of insecure property rights from the Ottoman 
Empire, and the Republican regime could not effectively solve it while it remained authoritarian. 
The economic recovery from the war destruction was rather quick and the Lausanne treaty 
helped foreign businesses fill part of the void created by the exodus of economically prosperous 
12 For an account these developments see Bianchi (1984). 
9 
minorities. Between 1924 and 1929, on average, real GDP per capita grew at about 5% per year 
by investing only 12.3% of the GDP (Hansen, 1992: Tables 9-2 and 9-3). Thus, while the 
volume of investment was relatively low, efficiency in the use of invested capital and TFP 
growth must have been substantial. The main source of this growth was agriculture, which in the 
1920s produced about half of the GDP and grew at the rate of 8.2 %. Agriculture greatly 
benefited from free trade, foreign involvement, and a variety of government support programs, 
particularly public investment in the sector's finance institutions and infrastructure.13 Industry 
did not receive much incentives or public investment in this period and its growth rate was not as 
spectacular (6.1% per year). The government could have bypassed the Lausanne treaty and 
protected specific domestic industries by instituting state monopolies over them, but it chose not 
to do so (Keyder, 1987: 96). These policies seem to have been quite reasonable given the 
conditions because at the time Turkish agriculture had a great deal of untapped resources, 
especially abundant land, and needed the attention of the government (Hansen, 1992: 331). 
Ottoman bureaucratic rule had largely failed to resolve agriculture's institutional and infrastructure 
problems. The RPP government could easily enhance economic efficiency by addressing some of 
those problems, in part thanks to its alliance with the landowners. 
When the Lausanne treaty expired in 1929, the government passed a law that provided a 
framework for regulation of foreign trade. It also took over the monopolies and infrastructure 
enterprises controlled by foreigners and hired domestic private firms to administer them. The end 
of the treaty also coincided with the onset of the Great Depression and a sharp drop in Turkey's 
terms of trade. Initially, the economy suffered a balance of payments problem and a considerable 
decline. But, the government soon allowed the domestic currency to depreciate and began to 
restrict imports and encourage domestic industrial production. The response to these import- 
substitution industrialization (ISI) policies was favorable: Between 1929 and 1932, 
manufacturing output expanded by more than 15% per year and even the hard-hit agriculture 
grew by about 5% per year. Although the rate of investment in the economy as a whole fell to 
about 8.5% of GDP, the growth rate of GDP per capita was approximately 3.7%, a highly 
respectable rate considering the external conditions of the economy at the time (Hansen 1992: 
321 and Table 9-2). Again, TFP growth must have been quite high (Hansen 1992: 331). 
Despite the performance record of the economy after 1929, the political elite had little confidence 
in the private sector to take full charge of the country's economic development (Hansen, 1992: 
322). This was partly due to the historical scarcity of entrepreneurial skills in the country and 
partly the result of the Great Depression, which critically damaged all market economies 
including the Turkish one. Also, the anticipated changes in the trade regime after the expiration of 
the Lausanne Treaty in 1929 induced rampant speculative activities and fueled the accusation 
that Turkish businessmen were corrupt and profiteer rather than enterprising and productive 
(Bugra, 1994: 101). At the same time, Turkey's political leaders could not ignore the concomitant 
13 Government investment in financing agricultural development had started under Ottoman rule. But, the state- 
owned Agricultural Bank established in 1889 had developed at a slow pace before 1924. The Republican 
government substantially strengthened this bank and expanded its activities (Hershlag, 1968: 48). 
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success of the industrialization drive in the Soviet Union, even though they were averse to 
instigate class-based ideologies (Hershiag, 1968: 63). This confluence of events led the leaders to 
the conclusion that the state should act as a pioneer in industrial development. This approach, 
labeled as etatism, involved an active ISI policy to direct the private sector and to support the 
public sector in addition to an investment program in public enterprises wherever private 
investment was considered inadequate (Hershlag, 1968: 73). 
The wave of increased state control over the economy started in 1930, partly in response to the 
speculative activities of 1929, by the passage of the Law for the Protection of Turkish Currency 
and the creation of a Central Bank that assumed the functions of issuing currency and controlling 
transactions in foreign currency. The Law was particularly indicative of the government's 
intention to gain extensive control. The text mandated the government to keep the currency 
stable without specifying limits to the type of measures that could be used for this purpose. 
Instead, it "incorporated the type of sanctions to be imposed against those who act in a way to 
hamper currency stability" (Bugra, 1994: 101). Another milestone in the government's 
involvement in the economy was the 1933 establishment of the Siimerbank which replaced the 
Bank for Industry and Mines and became the leading institution in the management and 
development of industrial public enterprises. Later on, in 1935, Etibank was also founded with 
similar responsibilities in the mining sector. Meanwhile, the government drew up a five-year plan 
in 1934 to coordinate all public investment activities. 
Under the etatist policy, investment as a share of GDP increased to about 10% during 1936- 
1938.14 This was below the 12.3% investment rate reached in the pre-etatist period of the late 
1920s. Yet, the per-capita GDP growth rate rose to over 5% again. Thus, the economy's overall 
TFP must have continued to grow at a fast pace, though the volume of investment was evidently 
too low. The inadequacy of capital formation was entirely due to the virtual stagnation of private 
investment. Public investment continued to grow rapidly and increased its share of the total from 
26% in the late 1920s to about 45% throughout the 1930s.15 That this shift did not cause a 
decline in TFP growth is indicative of the possibility for a government to operate a limited 
number of public enterprise without much efficiency loss. However, it also reflects the fact that, 
the industry-oriented rhetoric of etatism notwithstanding, the government did not lose sight of 
agriculture's continued long-term potential. Indeed, agriculture remained the focus of government 
attention and the main driving force in the economy: 
Throughout the whole interwar period, ..., public investment primarily supported 
agriculture. Even in the last years of interwar etatism, the government allocated 
only about 25 percent of public investment to industry against 50 percent to 
agriculture and railroads. In terms of actual investment, industry was never the 
primary concern of the government (Hansen, 1992: 329). 
14 The data in this paragraph are all based on Hansen (1992: Tables 9-2 and 9-3). 
15 Public enterprises established in the 1930s were highly capital intensive compared to the existing industrial 
ventures and may have displaced private investment (Hershlag, 1968: 106). 
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RPP leaders' attention to agriculture and their success in developing the sector is in stark contrast 
with the failure of the Ottoman government in this area. An important difference in the two 
situations is the much stronger alliance between the political elite and the landowners under the 
Republican government. Also, compared to the Young Turks period, the leadership had a 
stronger hold on power and took a longer view in its policy making. Indeed, the overall economic 
policy making under etatism marked high scores. The government was sensitive to the concerns 
of the producers and, in particular, emphasized policy stability. Monetary and budgetary 
policies were conservative and, despite rapid increase in government expenditures, inflationary 
financing was avoided (Hansen, 1992: 330). Even the distortions and rent-seeking inefficiencies of 
protectionism were minimized during the 1930s by instituting a uniform across-the-board tariff 
(Bugra, 1991). 
With the advent of World War II, the Turkish government decided to remain neutral between 
warring states. Given the international conditions at the time, the political elite found it necessary 
to prepare the country to defend its neutrality. Thus, Turkey began to rapidly expand and equip 
its army. To finance this mobilization, the government imposed burdensome price controls and 
taxes on the private sector, many of which fell on agriculture. Agricultural and overall economic 
growth rate turned negative.16 The only flourishing part of the economy was trade and finance, 
especially in areas that circumvented government controls. 
As the war went on, the government decided to act more freely in generating tax revenues. In 
particular, in 1942 it instituted a wealth levy that could be arbitrarily imposed on individuals 
(Keyder, 1987: 113). Although, as one might have expected, the bulk of this levy fell on non- 
Muslim merchants, wealthy Turks also had to live with the threat of arbitrary expropriation and, 
indeed, carried about a third of the burden. Such policies left a deep resentment in the private 
sector against the political leadership. The fact that the policies were established through law did 
not matter because the government had a great deal of discretion in writing the laws. Businessmen 
as well as landowners viewed the policies as "unjust" acts even though the leaders had been 
pressed by the exigencies of the war. These violations of the leadership's "implicit contracts" 
with the private sector were an important factor in the ultimate transformation of the political 
system into a more competitive one after World War II. 
5. POLICY UNCERTAINTY UNDER MULTI-PARTY RULE, 1946-1960 
Turkey's basic institutions did not change after World War II, except for a split in the RPP and 
the emergence of an opposition party. The political and economic developments between 1946 
and 1960 are witness to the significance of the potential turnover problem that this change 
brought about while political power remained highly concentrated. Efficiency of economic policy 
sharply declined and led to a crisis that was ultimately resolved by a major institutional change. 
16 It is estimated that during 1939-1945 agricultural, industrial, and total GDP declined at the annual rates of 6.0%, 
7.0%, and 5.4%, respectively. The public sector value added declined at the rate of 6.4%. However, the economy 
in this period has not been studied in much detail and these estimates may be biased downward. See Hansen 
(1992: 335). 
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At the end of World War II, Turkey was quick to align itself with the winners, especially the 
West that needed Turkey's cooperation in containing the Soviet Union. The promises of receiving 
foreign aid through the Marshall Plan and the prospects of trade and foreign investment were too 
great to be missed. Since private sector orientation seemed to reinforce these promises and 
prospects, the government reemphasized private sector development. However, the strained 
relationship between most interest groups and the RPP leadership at the end of the war provided 
an opportunity for a group of high ranking RPP members to split away and establish a new 
party, the Democrat Party (DP), seeking a new alliance with the private sector and hoping to rule 
by themselves. The remaining RPP members generally saw the DP-which was headed by Celal 
Bayar, a former prime minister and the founder of the Is Bank, and Adrian Menderes, a 
charismatic Assembly representative-as a potentially loyal opposition and allowed its 
formation to appease the disenchanted population.'7 At the same time, the RPP reformed its 
programs and policies and brought them close to what the opposition was offering. Indeed, by 
the late 1940s, there was no practical difference between the programs of the RPP and the DP 
(Ahmad, 1977: ch. I). Moreover, with a rapid post-war recovery during 1946-1950, the RPP 
leaders were confident that they would be able to continue their rule despite the private sector 
support for the Democrats. The lingering political repression prevented the leaders from 
appreciating the depth of the popular resentment. Many in RPP even held the view that the 
population must be thankful to the ruling party for its past accomplishments and its current 
democratization and liberalization. However, much to the surprise of RPP leaders, in the 
elections held in 1950 the DP won 90% of the popular vote and an overwhelming majority in the 
parliament. Bayar was elected president and he, in turn, appointed Menderes as the prime 
minister. 
To maintain their new position, the DP leaders faced three major problems. First, the RPP had 
deep roots in the bureaucracy and the army and could easily undermine DP rule.'8 Second, the 
private sector on which they hoped to rely was still quite diffuse and weak. Third, the large 
coalition that the DP had built was vulnerable to internal dissent. To respond to these problems, 
the DP leaders first moved to bring the army and the bureaucracy under their control by changing 
the entire upper echelons of the two hierarchies (Ahmad, 1977: 36 ff.). Later they raked through 
the bureaucracy and the judiciary by legislating laws that empowered the government to retire 
any state employee over sixty or with 25 years of service and to dismiss civil servants judged to 
be incompetent or politically involved (Alunad, 1977: 53; Bugra, 1994: 158). At the same time, 
the DP started a series of political skirmishes with the RPP and especially focused its attacks on 
the party's leader, Inonti. In addition, the government began to investigate the RPP's finances and, 
" There was a radical faction within the RPP that opposed political liberalization. But they did not prevail in the 
party. Besides, even that faction was hopeful that if liberalization did not work well, the opposition parties could 
be dissolved and the mono-party system restored. This had indeed happened twice before, in 1925 and 1930. 
For accounts and analysis of the events that led to the emergence a multi-party system in Turkey see Ahamd 
(1977), Chapter 1, and Turan (1984). 
18 Immediately after the elections there were rumors that the RPP might try to restore its power by force. However, 
the RPP leaders adhered to the rules they had set up and only mounted a political challenge to the DP rule. 
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after passing appropriate legislation, stripped the party of much of its property (Ahmad, 1977: 
44). 
To deal with their second problem, the DP leaders accelerated a process of trade liberalization 
already initiated by the RPP and proposed a program of privatization. Moreover, credit supply 
through state banks was eased tremendously to finance private sector activities (Hansen, 1992: 
344). The government also sought foreign assistance by joining the NATO pact and allowing 
American military bases in Turkey. These policies were expected to strengthen the private 
sector and improve economic conditions, thus buying the support of business leaders, 
landowners, and other participants in the private sector. 
Successful private sector development could have contributed to the resolution of the DP leaders' 
third problem. However, that would have been a long-term benefit and could not have helped in 
the short horizon of electoral cycles. A more certain solution was to use the extra-ordinary 
powers of the executive office to repress the internal and external opposition to party leaders 
and, more importantly, to create extensive patronage networks. The allocation of preferential 
credit, government contracts, and jobs in the public sector and the administration became 
important means of patronage, rewarding those who supported the DP and harassing those who 
opposed it (Heper, 1991b: 15). Later on, foreign exchange rationing also turned into another 
major source. The high degree of discretion used in these allocations gave rise to a "love-hate" 
relationship between the government and the private sector, which Bugra (1994) has extensively 
documented. The accusations and rumors of abuse of government power and resources was a 
daily subject of discussion in the newspapers throughout the 1950s. 
Economic policies of the 1950s had a short-horizon character that was in clear contrast with that 
of RPP policies during the 1930s. Trade liberalization was combined by a fixed exchange rate, a 
large agricultural price subsidy, and an enormous domestic credit expansion. This combination did 
not pose a serious problem in 1950-1952 because at the time Turkey enjoyed an unusually 
favorable terms of trade due to the commodity boom during the Korean War. But, once the boom 
ended, the policy was clearly unsustainable. The DP leaders, however, chose to deplete the 
foreign reserves of the Central Bank and increased foreign borrowing to continue the flow of 
imports and maintain the interests of their supporters in the private sector. At the same time, the 
government started to quickly invest in infrastructure, which created enormous government 
contracts, and in a series of sugar and cement plants, which came to be called "election factories." 
"The Democrats-and the same would probably have been equally true of the Republicans- 
began to give priority to economic projects that would also have a favorable political impact and 
guarantee votes in the next elections" (Ahmad, 1977: 128). These measures did in fact win 
another parliamentary majority for the DP in 1954. However, by then the subsidization and 
credit expansion policies had given rise to accelerating inflation. This further eroded the real 
exchange rate and increased the demand for imports. 
The government's response to inflation was extensive price controls, especially the prices of 
public enterprises, including infrastructure services. But, the deficit of these enterprises became 
another source of credit expansion. The problem of foreign exchange shortage was addressed by 
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rationing, which allowed the government to direct the flow of imports toward politically- 
determined targets. This was an effective tool of political control because in the free market 
foreign exchange commanded a very high premium over the official rate. By 1956, Turkey had 
entered a period of economic distress and political instability. This was largely a product of the 
domestic policy rather than exogenous shocks. Although the Turkish economy experienced a 
decline in its external terms of trade after 1953, these terms were at historically high levels and 
remained well above the terms of trade during 1925-1949 (Hansen, 1992: Figure 6-2). 
In 1957, the Democrats called for an early election with little time for the opposition to prepare. 
Although they again won a majority in the parliament, their share of the popular vote had 
declined to 47%. More importantly, the RPP questioned the legality and honesty of the 
elections and opposition activity intensified. The DP representatives in the Assembly passed 
legislation that significantly curtailed freedom of speech in public and in the Assembly itself. 
Rumors of a military conspiracy spread and the newspapers reported the arrest of nine officers. 
"Menderes was in a state of panic" (Ahmad, 1977: 57). 
In 1958, Turkey was in an economic crisis. Economic activity was declining, inflation was on the 
rise, and foreign creditors refused to finance the countries trade deficit. To resolve the balance of 
payments crisis, in mid-1958 the government accepted an IMF-sponsored stabilization program. 
A currency exchange tax of 221 % was imposed on all imports and capital transactions, which in 
effect devalued the Turkish lira. But, on the export side there was little shift in the exchange rate. 
The program also included removal of price controls, imposition of ceilings on credit and budget 
deficit, and trade liberalization (Hansen, 1992: 347). However, by 1959 the government had 
effectively abandoned the program and again inflation and current account were on the rise 
(Hershlag, 1968: 147). Turkey was headed toward another crisis, but Menderes and his fellow 
DP leaders could not restore confidence in the government and the economy. Finally, on May 27, 
1960, a group of junior military officers with the help of two senior officers as figureheads 
toppled the DP government with an almost bloodless coup.19 
The record of Turkey's economic growth during the 1950s was a relatively weak one. Although 
per capita GDP increased by an average rate of about 2%, most of the growth happened in the 
first half of the 1950s. The main source of growth in that period was agriculture. A great deal of 
foreign assistance and the credit extended to the private sector during 1950-1956 went to 
investment in tractors, which helped extend cultivated area and increase agricultural production at 
8-9% rates. When foreign exchange became short after 1956, the number of tractors peaked and 
the process came to an abrupt halt. The decline in the external terms of trade did not have much 
impact on the slowdown of agricultural growth because the internal terms of trade were insulated 
through a government subsidization scheme and were allowed to grow steadily throughout the 
1950s. The significance of tractors for the agricultural growth is also reflected in the fact that in 
19 Many leaders of the DP ended up in jail and Menderes and his finance and foreign ministers were later executed. 
The executions were quite puzzling and, perhaps, were carried out just to signal that there would be no return to 
the old politics and, especially, to the Democrat rule (Ahamd, 1977: 171). 
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this period there was little improvement in crop yields and probably no growth in the agricultural 
TFP (Hansen, 1992: 343). 
The weakness of TFP growth in the Turkish economy as a whole during the 1950s can be 
inferred from the investment and growth data. In this period, the share of investment in GDP 
was about 15%, which was 50% higher than the corresponding figure for the 1930s. However, 
per capita GDP growth rate during the 1950s was less than one half of the 1930s' record. The 
increased rate of investment itself may seem to be an achievement. But, this was not the 
consequence of strengthened incentives for investment in Turkey. Rather, it was made possible 
largely as a result of the superpower rivalry in the post-World War II international environment, 
which brought Turkey a windfall of foreign assistance and concessional loans. The emergence of 
the turnover potential in leadership under a system of concentrated power seems to have had a 
significant negative impact on economic performance and efficiency. 
The lack of confidence in the stability of government policies was also reflected in the sectoral 
pattern of private investment. During the 1950s, agricultural machinery and residential 
construction dominated private investment (Hansen, 1922: 344). Neither domestic nor foreign 
investors, who were being courted to bring in their capital and help mitigate Turkey's foreign 
exchange shortage, showed much interest in long-term investments in industry (Ahmad, 1977: 
128-132). Indeed, this was one of the main reasons why the privatization attempt of the early 
1950s completely failed (Hershlag, 1968: 140). Businessmen were not willing to pay much for 
public enterprises when easy policy change could dramatically change the fortunes of privatized 
firms: 
Some business representatives suggested unrealistically privileged conditions of 
transfer, making the purchasing of the shares of state enterprises almost less risky 
but more profitable than the purchasing of government bonds. Even under such 
conditions, there were, as Prime Minister Menderes stated in 1954, too many 
profitable investment opportunities in the country for the private sector to show 
any interest in taking over the industrial establishments under state ownership 
(Bugra, 1994: 123). 
Lack of experience and sufficient financial capability were perhaps other factors that prevented 
the domestic entrepreneurs from actively investing in industry. However, government policy was 
supposed to overcome those problems and help develop the private sector. The government was 
unable to follow effective policies of that type because it could not establish the required long- 
term commitments. 
The 1950s could have been much more successful years for the Turkish economy. The economy 
enjoyed favorable external terms-of-trade for most of the period and received substantial foreign 
aid and loans. Nevertheless, foreign exchange shortage became a chronic problem and the 
economy performed poorly, especially compared to the 1930s when the external conditions were 
not nearly as favorable. As the comparison with the experience of the 1960s further confirms 
(see below), the turnover in a government with concentrated power was the most likely culprit. 
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Of course, the experience of the 1950s may have also been the result of factors other than the 
institutional characteristics of the country at that time; e.g., the personality of the leaders. But, 
comparisons with other periods generally tend to underline the significance of institutional 
characteristics in determining economic policy and performance. In particular, although the 
personalities of the leaders certainly matter, it is interesting to note that the economic policies of 
the DP were not very different from those of the RPP during 1946-1950 (Hansen, 1992: 340). 
Agriculture was given priority by keeping its terms of trade favorable, by providing it with cheap 
credit, and by increasing public investment in its infrastructure and inputs. The DP 
administration also accelerated a land reform program initiated by the RPP to distribute state- 
owned pastures to farmers. In industry, the public sector maintained its share. Finally, trade 
liberalization and attempts to attract foreign aid were both underway well before 1950. 
6. POLICY STABILITY UNDER UNSTABLE GOVERNMENTS, 1961-1980 
Political instability was a hall mark of the two decades that followed the 1960 coup d'etat. But 
the first seventeen years of that period were one the most successful periods in Turkey's 
economic history, only matched by the experience of the 1930s. The key to the reconciliation of 
these two facts is the institutional constraints that the 1960 junta imposed on the political 
system. Indeed, these constraints themselves may have been partly responsible for the political 
instability when the government proved unable to deal with the system's rigidities. The 
institutional setup worked well when the parameters of the system were stable, but had 
difficulty in dealing with large changes in its exogenous conditions and ended up in a major 
political and economic crisis. 
The leaders of the 1960 coup had little agreement over what to do with the government they had 
taken over. In the power struggle that ensued, the senior officers managed to gain an upper hand 
and to prevent a radicalization of the government (Ahmad, 1977: 159-172). The military leaders 
who dominated found it necessary to run the country with the help of civilian politicians. They 
also considered themselves as part of the elite of the country and were strong believers in 
Westernization. Therefore, from the beginning they promised quick return to democratic civilian 
rule as soon as some fundamental institutional reforms were in place to prevent the reemergence 
of the pre-1960 type of crises. 
The junta, in consultation with a group of university professors, diagnosed the main sources of 
Turkey's political and economic problems as excessive concentration of power and policy 
uncertainty. To diffuse power, in a new constitution ratified in July 1961 they sought to further 
democratize the country's politics by instituting a system of proportional representation in the 
parliament. This institutional change was strengthened by granting freedom of association in a 
broad sense and allowing a variety of interest groups to participate in the political process. In 
addition, the constitution created a Senate as an upper chamber of the parliament, which helped 
represent specific institutions in the legislature. In particular, twenty-three members of the junta 
were appointed as Life Senators (Ahmad, 1977: 186). The Senate also served as the vehicle of 
continuity in the parliament: only one-third of the Senate's regular members were subject to 
reelection every two years. Moreover, a Constitutional Court was created that could review the 
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constitutionality of the legislation and impeach any official in the government. The causes of 
power diffusion and continuity were served furthermore by reducing the power of the president's 
office, while extending the term to seven years. The president was to be elected from among the 
members of the two chambers with a two-thirds majority. Finally, the military formed a 
committee, the High Command, that retained vigil over politicians' activities. 
To deal with policy uncertainty, a number of administrative checks and balances were introduced 
while encouraging planning. The epitome of this approach was the establishment of the State 
Planning Organization (SPO) on September 30, 1960. The primary responsibility of the SPO was 
the formulation and implementation of a series of five-year plans within the context of 15-year 
strategic plans. The plans were meant to be comprehensive. Hence, Article 129 of the 1961 
constitution stated that: 
Economic, social, and cultural development is based on a plan. Development is 
carried out according to this plan. The organization and functions of the State 
Planning Organization, the principles to be observed in the preparation and 
execution, and application and revision of the plan, and the measures designed to 
prevent changes tending to impair the unity of the plan, shall be regulated by 
special legislation. 
That special legislation was the Law concerning the Enforcement and Preservation of the 
Integrity of the Long-Term Plan, approved on October, 16, 1962, which allowed the SPO to 
monitor, among other things, the allocation of credit, foreign exchange, and public investment and 
expenditure (Hershlag, 1968: 188). The SPO could use its supervisory role to reallocate foreign 
exchange and credit and, as a punishment, withhold them from enterprises that did not follow the 
plan. This gave the SPO and its plans an influential position in all economic and social policy 
making (Onis and Riedel, 1993: 99). The five-year plans, once approved, imposed constraints on 
the government for five years which made policy change quite difficult. Moreover, since each 
plan was to be drafted when the previous one was under implementation, there was a continuity 
in the objectives and even specific means of consecutive plans. 
Changes in both political and administrative institutions had a mutually-reinforcing effect in 
committing the government for a long time to a given set of initial policies.20 Under the new 
institutional setup, any major policy change required at least the approval of the two chambers of 
the parliament, the president, the Constitutional Court, and the military High Command. In 
addition, proportional representation implied that politicians would have little incentive to unite 
and maintain solidarity under large parties. As a result, the legislature would be fragmented and, 
to initiate policy change, political leaders would have to engage in extensive coalition building 
even within their own parties. Thus, while the new political institutions allowed a wider 
20 This served the purposes of the military Commanders well because they could initiate certain policies and then 
turn the government to civilian politicians. The policies would be implemented without the Commanders 
themselves directly managing the government. 
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representation and enhanced democratization, they imposed major constraints on policy change 
as well. The administrative framework also encouraged continuation of the existing policies at 
both stages of design and implementation. 
Under the new institutional setup, the initial policy design had paramount importance because it 
could shape the course of the economy for a long time. Moreover, the success and failure of the 
policy would influence the fate of the institutional setup itself. In the policy debates and 
deliberations that took place over the First Five-Year Plan, the participants-military 
Commanders, technocrats, civilian politicians, landowners, and business leaders-showed an 
overwhelming concern to guarantee minimum distributive shares for various socio-economic 
groups to create a sense of "fairness" and buy widespread political support and credibility for the 
plans as well as for the system as a whole (Ahmad, 1977: 270-275). They were also concerned 
about the stability of the economic system and searched for ways to minimize the impact of 
internal and external shocks. As a result, the economic policies incorporated in the First Five- 
Year Plan (1963-67), which continued in the Second Plan (1968-72), had four important 
components: 
1.The plan specified detailed wage and price guidelines, sectoral investment allocations, and 
fiscal activities in various areas. 
2.The plan followed a principle of "equal treatment" of the public and private sectors: 
roughly half of the planned investment had to be carried out by the government (Hershlag, 
1968: 189). 
3.The plan had a clear ISI bias: it focused on domestic markets, took exports as exogenous, 
and sought to minimize import requirements (Onis and Riedel, 1993: 100). 
4.The plan restricted inflationary financing of the budget deficit (Hansen: 1992: 422). 
The first two components helped freeze the relative economic positions of various interest 
groups, reflecting their balance of power in the early 1960s. Maintaining a large public sector was 
essential for this purpose because it was an important tool of guaranteeing minimum real incomes 
for the workers and customers of public enterprises. Leaving the task largely to the private 
sector was viewed as risky because, with the weaknesses of the private entrepreneurship 
especially in the industrial sector, policy designers had no way of assuring that sufficient private 
investment would occur in desired sectors. Incorporating public investment in the plan could 
guarantee a pattern of minimum investments to strengthen the belief that the plan would not fail. 
This effect together with the subsidized inputs public enterprises offered to the private sector 
were expected to induce private investment take place according to the plan. 21 The last two main 
components of the plans were further instruments for ensuring the stability of the system. 
Keeping the economy stable and insulated seemed to fit the needs of the system well because, 
with the rigidities introduced by the first two components and the costs of policy change, 
internal economic instability and external shocks could derail the whole scheme. In fact, this view 
21 Conway (1990) finds that during this period in Turkey public investment crowded in private investment, at least 
in the short run. 
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of import restrictions and state-led development was widespread at the time both inside and 
outside Turkey.22 The Turkish elite could have easily drawn such conclusions from the 
experience of the 1950s when the destabilization of the economy was preceded by trade 
liberalization, declining terms of trade, inflationary deficit financing, and ad hoc market controls. 
The first elections after the promulgation of the new constitution were held in October 1961. The 
electoral rules and the freedom of association had given rise to a proliferation of political parties 
and interest group organizations. The DP was banned from reconstituting itself. But, the 
Democrats established a number of new parties, the strongest of which turned out to be the 
Justice Party (JP). As with their predecessor, the neo-Democrat parties were supported by the 
private sector at large, but each one tended to represent more specific interests. The neo- 
Democrats did relatively well in the elections, although no party obtained a majority and the RPP 
ended up with the highest number of seats in the Assembly. Under pressure from the 
Commanders, all parties agreed to respect the previous decisions of the junta and also to elect 
General Cemal Gursel, the leader of the junta, as president. Then, President Gursel asked the 
RPP leader Inonu to form a government. In the following three years, Inonu entered into three 
different coalitions with the neo-Democrats. The main contentious issue in these coalitions was 
the nature of the policies to be followed in the plans. The RPP leaned toward more radical 
reforms, while the neo-Democrat parties were dominated by conservatives (Ahmad, 1977: ch. 
VIII). The outcome of these controversies were the plan characteristics outlined above. 
In 1965, President Gursel set the RPP aside and allowed an independent politician supported by 
the JP to form the cabinet. The JP won a majority in the 1965 elections. By then, Suleyman 
Demirel, the leader of the JP, had established connections with the bureaucracy and the army, 
assuring them of cooperation and respect for the institutions and policies established under the 
1960 junta. Demirel was allowed to become prime minister and even continue in 1970 when the 
JP lost its majority and suffered a split within the party. In 1966, President Gursel resigned due 
to poor health and was replaced with General Cevdet Sunay, the Chief of the General Staff. The 
second half of the 1960s was a period of relative stability in the government, but there were 
strong cleavages within the JP that Demirel kept under control only until 1970. 
By most measures, the policies implemented under the five-year plans were highly 
"distortionary" (Krueger, 1974). The stability in the government was no greater than in the 
1950s, especially before 1966 and after 1969. Yet, the performance of the economy during the 
First and Second Plans was quite strong. Turnover in the cabinet did not seem to have much 
negative impact on policy stability and economic growth. Indeed, confidence in the continuity of 
policies seemed to outweigh the distortions caused by those policies. The economy initially 
stagnated during 1960-62 when institutional and policy uncertainties were being resolved and the 
country was experiencing an adverse terms-of-trade shock. But then the GDP per capita began to 
12Hansen (1992: 363-365) quotes the OECD Economic Surveys for Turkey during the 1960s indicating support for 
ISI in Turkey. 
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steadily grow at rates over 4% per year, close to the target of the plan.23 At least one quarter to 
one third of this growth was due to improvements in TFP.24 
Industry led the process with a growth rate of over 10% per year and an annual TFP growth of 
about 2.4%. Agriculture grew less spectacularly, but it did much better than it had in the second 
half of the 1950s. In particular, crop yields increased by an average of about 2.7% per year. 
Average investment share in GDP rose to about 18.5%, of which less than 8% was financed by 
external borrowing and the rest, 92%, largely originated in the domestic savings. The private 
sector played the part assigned to it by the plans and contributed more than 50% of this 
investment. Also, at least until 1970, government deficit remained low and monetary growth 
occurred largely through credit extension to the private sector. As a result, during the 1960s 
inflation remained remarkably steady at about 5%. The nominal exchange rate was held constant 
until 1970, but for quite some time its slow real appreciation did not cause any serious balance of 
payments problem. Finally, the internal terms of trade between agriculture and industry remained 
essentially unchanged. Throughout this period, external conditions were relatively stable. 
Toward the end of the 1960s, political leaders faced two major problems under the new 
institutional setup. One problem was the rise of labor and middle class political activism and 
militancy. Over time, economic growth, especially in the 1960s, had expanded the ranks of these 
groups. But, their role in the country's politics was small and their share in the economy had 
remained low (Aksoy, 1980). In the late 1960s, these groups became more active and, given the 
rights granted by the 1961 constitution, began to organize. In particular, unionism among workers 
grew fast and in 1967 an independent nation-wide labor organization, the Confederation of 
Revolutionary Workers' Unions, was formed.25 The activism of such organizations coincided 
with large migrations of Turkish workers to West Germany and helped reverse the trend in real 
wages and labor share. However, the system had a great deal of inertia and progress was slow. 
This, together with the on-going breakdown of the traditional culture in Turkey and the world- 
wide spread of militant leftist politics, led to increasing civil unrest, student militancy, and 
violence.26 Since the diffuse nature of power prevented the government from acting decisively, 
the elite began to consider a constitutional amendment to strengthen the government. But, the 
amendment required the consent of small parties, which opposed the measure because it implied 
a curb on their power. 
Z' The data presented in this paragraph are based on Onis and Riedel (1993), Tables 5.1 and 6.13, and Hansen 
(1992), Tables 6-6, 6-7, 9-6, 11-1, and 11-6. These sources, as well as Walstedt (1980), Chapter 3, provide 
detailed analyses of economic performance during the 1960s and 1970s. 
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Hansen (1992: 356) estimates the rate of TFP growth during 1958-1975 at 1.1% per year. However, TFP growth 
during 1972-75 was strongly negative (Hansen, 1992: Table 11-1) and is likely to have been so during 1958-62. 
25 Labor unions were outlawed in the early years of the Republic. The ban was lifted after World War 11, but until 
1967 the main labor organization was an officially controlled confederation, TURK-IS (Mumcuoglu, 1980). 
26 For an insightful analysis of the causes of social unrest in Turkey see Mardin (1978). 
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Another growing problem during the late 1960s was the deterioration of the current account. The 
memory of the 1958 foreign exchange crisis and its aftermath was still fresh in the politicians' 
minds and they did not want to allow that episode to be repeated (Ahmad, 1977: 198). But, 
changing the exchange rate would affect the delicate equilibrium of the system and trigger a wave 
of renegotiations of the relative positions. The uncertainty associated with such a realignment 
was large and could endanger the entire institutional setup. This was indeed what happened 
when, after much debate, support for a devaluation grew and, finally, in August 1970 the Turkish 
lira was devalued by 66%. Following this adjustment, the Assembly was quick to approve large 
salary increases for civil servants. However, the same could not be easily done for many other 
groups. Workers, peasants, and private businesses all demanded compensation for the 
devaluation. To ease the tension, the government kept the prices of public sector products low. 
Public enterprises soon developed large deficits and the government's attempt to subsidize them 
fueled inflation (Onis and Riedel, 1993: 23). Imbalances among different wages and prices that 
followed could only exacerbate the growing political conflicts among various interest groups. 
Observing the rising tensions and the government's inability to deal with the situation, military 
commanders found it necessary to take a more active role. In March 1971, they asked Demirel to 
step down. Soon martial law was imposed on Turkey's major cities and a cabinet of technocrats 
was appointed. This cabinet, and a similar one that replaced it in 1972, managed to amend the 
constitution, pass laws, and set up special courts that allowed the government to curb civil unrest 
and political activism, especially on the part of the labor organizations and leftist groups 
(Ahmad, 1977: 310). These measures sharply reduced real wages and, together with the 
devaluation, helped maintain the pace of investment and economic growth. The impact on the 
balance of payments was particularly favorable: Between 1970 and 1973, the dollar value of 
exports jumped by 125% and the remittances from Turkish workers in West Germany 
quadrupled. For the first time since World War II, the current account balance turned strongly 
positive. By 1973, the conditions were sufficiently promising to warrant a return to 
parliamentary rule. 
The restriction on the activities of the leftist political parties and groups, greatly benefited the 
RPP (Ahmad, 1977: 312). The RPP had moved left of center during the mid-1960s to strengthen 
itself against the neo-Democrat parties. It now could act as the only viable channel for legal leftist 
activity. However, this was by no means sufficient to secure a parliamentary majority for the 
RPP. The main consequence of this change was that it enabled the RPP to become the nucleus of 
parliamentary coalitions and help break up coalitions built around the JP. This made the years 
between 1973 and 1980 the most unstable period in the history of Turkish government. From 
1974 to 1980, five elections were held, but no party achieved a parliamentary majority and the 
government changed hands between the RPP, the JP, and a caretaker coalition seven times (Onis 
and Riedel, 1993: Table 14.3). 
Despite the instability in the government, economic growth accelerated after 1973 and made the 
Third Five-Year Plan (1973-77) quite successful in terms of investment and growth. Real GDP 
per capita grew at close to 5% per year and investment rose to 21.7% of the GDP. The private 
sector was again an active participant in this process and especially tried to increase its presence 
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in industry, even though the real wages recovered from their slump of the early 1970s and 
industry's domestic terms of trade vis-a-vis agriculture remained unfavorable.27 The constraints 
imposed on the government by the institutional setup continued to keep policies generally stable 
despite the high turnover in the cabinet. 
The general characteristics of the Third Plan were in many respects similar to those of the first 
two. It continued to implement ISI policies and allowed the exchange rate to continuously 
become overvalued. However, partly as a result of the events following the 1970 devaluation, 
fiscal discipline and foreign borrowing restraints of the Third Plan were weaker than those of its 
predecessors. Also, the circumstances surrounding the Third Plan were different in at least four 
other respects. First, Turkey suffered a major terms of trade shock following the oil price hikes 
of 1973-1974. This event also negatively affected the job opportunities for Turkish workers in 
Europe and led to a reduction of remittance revenues. Second, in 1974 there was a coup in 
Cyprus, to which Turkey responded by invading the Turkish-speaking region of the island. This 
caused a ban in the United States on the sale of arms and a reduction in economic assistance to 
Turkey. Third, the recycling of petrodollars in international capital markets tremendously 
increased the supply of foreign loans. For Turkey, these loans could lessen the impact of the 
terms of trade shock and remittance and aid reduction. Fourth, industrialization had advanced and 
the marginal return of ISI projects had declined. Under these circumstances a major overhaul of 
economic policy, especially with respect to the relative prices of tradables and public sector 
products, was in order. But, under the existing institutional setup, the task was monumental. 
With the option to borrow externally, the system failed to respond to the need for reform and 
postponed its day of reckoning (Saracoglu, 1994). 
During the Third Plan the deficit of public enterprises and the government substantially 
increased. The output prices of these enterprises were being raised very slowly, while their input 
costs and wage bills were growing no slower than the rate of inflation (about 20% per year). As 
long as external financing was forthcoming, the deficit growth did not lead to much acceleration in 
the rate of inflation. However, when foreign lending came to a halt at the end of the Plan, a sharp 
rise in inflation was inevitable. By 1979, the rate of inflation reached 60%. Another consequence 
of the rigidity in public sector prices was a decline in the performance of public enterprises. The 
quality of public sector products declined and their inefficiencies mounted (Keyder, 1987: 168- 
171; Kjellstrom, 1990). By the 1970s, the public sector was too large and diversified to lend itself 
to flexible management by the government. The exhaustion of the ISI possibilities reinforced this 
effect and reduced the efficiency of investment in both public and private sector enterprises. The 
result of all this was that during 1973-1976, the TFP growth in manufacturing declined by 1.2% 
per year (Hansen, 1992: Table 11.1). 
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Given the crisis of the system toward the end of 1970s, it may be puzzling why private investors did not foresee 
the demise and continued to invest in the mid-1970s. However, until 1977 it was not clear that the system could 
not cope with its problems. Before then, the government continued to offer strong incentives for investment and 
external conditions could become favorable again. 
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In the early 1970s the system had managed to respond to some imbalances and, with the help of 
the military establishment, avoid a serious crisis. But, those imbalances were not nearly as great 
as the ones that emerged during the mid-1970s. In the second half of the 1970s foreign debt, 
especially of short-term nature, accumulated at a rapid rate. By the end of 1977, Turkey was 
unable to service its foreign debt and in March 1978 signed a stand-by agreement with the IMF. 
Yet, no reform materialized and the IMF blocked its loan. The country plunged into a serious 
political and economic crisis. Between 1977 and 1980, private investment plummeted by 50% 
and the average real wage rate by 45% (Onis and Riedel, 1993). 
To understand how the institutional mechanisms actually worked and prevented a badly needed 
policy change to take effect, it is instructive to briefly examine the process of formation and 
implementation of a reform plan that was finally adopted in January 1980. In October 1979, an 
RPP-led coalition suffered a setback in parliamentary by-elections and resigned. The JP then 
formed a coalition with a smaller party and came to power. The JP leaders were determined to 
develop a major liberalization program, but to protect it from early sabotage gave no hint of their 
intentions during the election campaign and kept the program secret before its was ready to be 
adopted. The program was prepared by a newly formed team of technocrats under the leadership 
of Turgut Ozal, who had previously served in the SPO but had left the government to join a 
private corporation and had used private sector associations to voice his views in favor of 
economic liberalization. As Krueger and Turan (1983) document in detail, the team worked with 
extreme secrecy, extracting information from the bureaucracy in ways that did not arouse 
suspicion. They even kept the cabinet, including the ministers whose domain of responsibility 
included the measures of the program, in the dark. Meanwhile, the consent of the president was 
obtained to sign the decree once approved by the cabinet. On the other hand, Ozal briefed the 
military Commanders to buy their support for an urgent program to control inflation and increase 
exports. 
Although the reform program comprised a range of measures to stabilize and liberalize the 
economy, the initial measures taken were those that could be immediately decided within the 
cabinet. These consisted of (1) a devaluation, (2) some foreign trade and payments liberalization 
and export incentives, (3) decontrolling of public enterprise prices, and (4) an administrative 
reorganization plan to assign the implementation of the reform package to new agencies directly 
responsible to the prime minister. A number of other measures that could be treated in the same 
manner, such as adjustments in interest rates and agricultural prices, were postponed. Other parts 
of the program, such as a tax reform badly needed for stabilization purposes, had to be ratified by 
the parliament and required more time. 
On January 24, 1980, Prime Minister Demirel forced the package of initial reform measures 
through the cabinet. Shortly before the meeting the Commanders had given a hint that they were 
ready to intervene, and the politicians understood that they would be out of office if economic 
problems are not addressed. The ministers were essentially told that the package was the last 
change and they should go along with it in that same meeting or resign (Krueger and Turan, 1993). 
Soon the program was announced to the public and implementation began. It was expected that 
these initial measures would trigger an irreversible process in which other complementary parts 
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of the program would follow. However, before long the more significant obstacles to change 
began to impose themselves. Political opposition began to mount and adjustment in other prices 
and policies started. Other stages of the program were also stalled. Even some of the measures 
taken later within the cabinet, such as the adjustment in the buying price of wheat, failed to 
follow the spirit of the program (Krueger and Turan, 1993). Other parts of the reform requiring 
legislation were in worse shape: the parliamentary debates did not sustain any hope that their 
ratification was imminent. Meanwhile, inflation accelerated to 110%, the economic crisis 
deepened, and political turmoil and violence escalated. 
In September 1980 the army intervened and took control of the government to restore order, 
overhaul the political system, and implement the reform program. Two years later, Ozal who had 
been retained to continue his program commented:28 
If the intervention of September 12 had not been conducted, we would not have 
been able to obtain the results of the economic program. Anarchy was on the rise 
and the tax laws did not go through the National Assembly. We should be thankful 
that a tax reform has been conducted .... 
7. ECONOMIC LIBERALISM AND POLICY UNCERTAINTY, 1981-1991 
Since 1980 Turkey has experienced a major shift in its economic policy orientation. ISI has been 
abandoned in favor of export promotion and more liberal policies. The role of the government as a 
major producer of goods and services has also diminished, except in the infrastructure sectors. 
Yet, economic performance during the first decade following the reforms was much weaker than 
under first three Five-Year Plans. The problem seems to be a return to a high concentration of 
government power combined with electoral turnover concerns. The institutional changes that gave 
rise to this situation were rooted in the elite's diagnosis of the reasons behind the inability of the 
government under the 1960-1980 institutional setup to respond to shifts in the economy's 
conditions. The outcome may have been partly unintended because power concentration was a 
transient feature of the new institutional setup designed to help the system to break away from 
the past policies and the vicious circle during the late 1970s. Although the feature helped more 
market-oriented policies be implemented in the early 1980s, it had the opposite effect during the 
later years and left the government with highly inefficient set of policies at a time when power 
concentration substantially declined and policy reform became considerably more difficult. 
The turn to economic liberalism and emphasis on private sector production was in clear contrast 
with the orientation of policies during the 1960s and 1970s. This was partly due to the political 
leaders' realization of the limits of ISI and public sector production. Also, the winds of ideological 
change around the world had left their marks in Turkey. However, the recognition of the 
importance of markets and private entrepreneurship was not new to the Turkish elite. At least 
during the 1920s and 1950s they had followed liberal economic policies, with disappointing 
28 Quoted in Krueger and Turan (1993: 363). 
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results in the latter period. What encouraged them to return to those policies in 1980 was a crisis 
for which government controls over markets and productive enterprises could be held 
responsible.29 The public sector had grown large and the economy had become complex. 
Managing the controls had become increasing costly, especially in the face of changing 
circumstances. At the same time, a diversified and experienced private sector had emerged in the 
country that could manage the tasks of investment and production in a decentralized manner. The 
private sector had also formed a number of associations independent of the government- 
controlled chambers of commerce that offered forums for effective communication of business 
problems and informed debates over policy alternatives. Most prominent among these 
associations was the 200-member Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association 
(TOSIAD), which by the late 1970s was actively publicizing its views and gaining the attention 
of the politicians (Arat, 1991).30 
The 1980 coup was led by General Kenan Evren, the Chief of the General Staff. The junta 
established martial law, dissolved the Assembly, and took control of all government functions. 
Activities of all political parties were banned, media censorship was imposed, and many interest 
group associations, such as independent labor unions, were outlawed. The Commanders 
promised a return to democracy once the situation stabilized and the fundamental flaws of the 
political system were corrected. While the needed political reforms were being contemplated, the 
Commanders allowed Ozal to continue his reform program. 
The key features of the post-1961 political system that the Commanders held responsible for 
lack of appropriate policy response to the crises of the 1970s was the diffuse nature of 
government power and institutional constraints on policy making. 31 Accordingly, the new 
constitution ratified in 1982 and its accompanying institutional changes increased the power of 
the prime minister and permitted greater flexibility in policy making. The most important 
institutional changes in this respect were: (1) A minimum 10% of the popular vote was required 
for a party to be eligible to participate in the parliament. This ended the extreme fragmentation of 
the parliament and supported the formation of larger parties and majority governments. (2) The 
Senate was eliminated to reduce veto filters on legislation. (3) The prime minister was allowed to 
dismiss a minister without the entire cabinet having to resign. (4) The government was given 
greater opportunities to issue decree-laws. (5) Severe restrictions were imposed on the 
movements of parliamentary deputies from one party to another by allowing the majority in the 
Assembly to take away membership and limit the right to future candidacy of any deputy who 
resigned from a party (Evin, 1994; Heper, 1994). Another factor that increased the prime 
minister's power was a series of constitutional restrictions on the activities of political parties 
29 For a theoretical argument and a cross-country empirical investigation of the determinants of market-oriented 
reforms in developing countries which supports these claims see Campos and Esfahani (forthcoming). 
30 "fUSIAD largely represents the dozen or so major conglomerates that have come to dominate the private sector. 
For an analysis of the background and provisions of the constitutional reforms in the early 1980s, see Tachau 
(1984: Chapter 3). 
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and interest group associations. 32 These restrictions were potent because their terms were rather 
general and gave the government substantial leeway. A case in point is the government's ability 
to ban any association deemed to have acted outside its "specialized" area. Labor unions could 
not support political parties or make political demands and business associations could not 
publicly discuss government policies in ways that had political overtones (Sakallioglu, 1991; 
Arat, 1991). The term of the Assembly was increased to five years to lengthen the horizon of the 
government. 
Although the above features increased the freedom of the executive to act relative to the 1961- 
1980 situation, by themselves they could not concentrate power to the extent of pre-1960 
system. This was particularly the case because there was some increase in the powers of the 
president as well to enable the office holder to act as a balancing force and to break the stalemates 
in the legislature and call for early elections if the government goes without a confirmed cabinet 
for more than 45 days. However, there was another factor that had substantial impact on the 
prime minister's discretion during the 1980s and brought the parallel closer. The 1982 
constitution placed a ten-year ban on political activity by some 700 politicians who led the 
political parties of the 1970s. This left the field largely open for Ozal to form the Motherland 
Party (MP) and run on his record of economic management in the early 1980s. With other 
political parties in disarray, the 10% minimum popular vote requirement gave the MP a 
comfortable majority in the parliament throughout the 1980s. 
The economic consequences of the reform program under the military government (1981-1983) 
were mainly stabilization and restructuring. The government emphasized real depreciation, export 
incentives, tight monetary policy, tax increase, deregulation of interest rates, ceiling on wage 
increases, and relaxation of controls on the public sector (Saracoglu, 1994). Import liberalization 
was more gradual. Inflation declined to the 30-35% range and per capita GDP growth rose 
moderately to 1.8%.33 Despite a terms of trade shock, the value of exports doubled in two years 
and the balance of payments stabilized. The decline in the deficit of public enterprises allowed 
the government to step up its investment, especially in infrastructure, by about 1% of the GDP. 
But, the share of private investment in GDP remained essentially unchanged from its low level in 
late 1970s despite the fact that the real wage rates were rapidly declining (Onis and Riedel, 1993: 
Figures 10.3 and 14.1). 
The skepticism of the private sector was not baseless. There was uncertainty about the 
consequences of return to civilian rule and even about the policies of the military government 
itself. The Commanders were interested in maintaining their influence after transition to civilian 
rule and, once the constitution was ratified, became more responsive to the electorate, although 
32 Many leftist parties and organizations and Kurdish separatist movements have always been outlawed by a 
perennial provision of the Turkish constitutions that no party or organization could profess ideologies that would 
divide the nation; e.g., by encouraging class conflict or separatism. 
The macroeconomic data presented in the rest of this section are based on the World Bank's World Tables, 1993, 
unless noted otherwise. 
27 
with a short-term view of their policies. An important event that illustrates these concerns is the 
so-called Banker's crisis in 1982. Financial liberalization of 1980 had allowed an unregulated 
network of brokerage houses (called Banker) to grow. In the summer of 1982, when these 
institutions controlled about one-fourth of money in circulation, the largest banker failed and 
triggered a run on the system. While Ozal felt that the government should not do anything about 
the crisis, the Commanders were persuaded to intervene (Krueger and Turan, 1983: 366). As a 
result, Ozal resigned and was replaced by a bureaucrat closer to the concerns of the military 
leaders. In the following year, the reform lost momentum and inflation began to rise. 
The first general elections under the 1982 constitution was held in November 1983 with only 
three parties permitted to offer candidates: a party supported by the military, another one 
representing social democrats, and the MP. Ozal's success in the implementation of the reform 
program and his distance from the military after the Banker's crisis made him a clear choice for 
most of the electorate. The MP managed to win 45.1% of the popular vote and a large majority in 
the National Assembly. Ozal became the prime minister. General Evren had earlier been elected 
president as part of the referendum on the constitution. 
Once in office, Ozal began to use his control over both the executive and the legislature to create 
instruments that allowed him to direct economic policy freely. This included establishing agencies 
and funds that could be used to bypass the bureaucracy as well as the Assembly. The key agency 
created in this manner for economic policy making was the Undersecretariat for Treasury and 
Foreign Trade, which took over the most important functions of the Ministry of Finance and the 
SPO. In addition, the government significantly expanded the use of "contract personnel" who did 
not have job security and could be appointed at all levels of the bureaucracy without the entry 
and promotion requirements of the regular staff (Waterbury, 1993: 258). Another major move 
was the establishment of extra-budgetary funds (EBFs) that could be spent without prior 
parliamentary approval. These funds and the sources on which they could set levies had to be 
legislated, but the levies and expenditures of the funds were decided by the cabinet (Onis, 1991). 
EBFs had existed before in Turkey, but on a limited scale. In 1981, they accounted for 1.3% of 
GNP. However, after 1983 EBFs proliferated quickly and came to control 11 % of GNP and more 
than half of all government revenue in 1990 (Onis and Webb, 1994: 152). These developments 
permitted Ozal to grow autocratic, "increasingly bypassing the cabinet, the Parliament, and the 
MP and consulted mostly with his team of young technocrats, his brothers and close relatives, 
and few trusted aids" (Sayari, 1992). 
By the mid-1980s pressure was mounting to lift the ban on the excluded politicians. Ozal 
campaigned against the constitutional amendment, but since he had gained his office in a restricted 
election and his legitimacy was in question, a referendum was scheduled for 1987. When the poll 
lifted the ban, Ozal called for new elections in short order. While the opposition was still 
disorganized and fragmented, the MP took over two-thirds of the seats in the Assembly with 
only 36.3% of the popular vote. Support for the MP in these elections was also aided by 
increases in public works projects, cheap credit for the private sector, and subsidies paid to 
public enterprises to keep their prices down. In fact, the central bank credit to the government 
grew by 60% in 1987 compared to 40% in both 1986 and 1988 (Onis and Webb, 1994: 170). As 
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a result, inflation which had declined to the 30-40% range in the mid- I980s accelerated to almost 
80% in 1988 despite deflationary measures taken after the elections. 
During 1984-1989, Turkey benefited from a steady improvement in its terms of trade. Average 
per-capita GDP growth rate increased to about 3% and the share of investment in GDP reached 
22.8%, as compared to 21.8% during 1981-1983. A comparison of these figures with those in the 
1930s and 1960s suggests that TFP growth may not have been very high in the 1980s. Also, the 
increase in investment was almost entirely due to the expansion in public investment, largely 
financed by foreign borrowing. However, the private sector orientation of government policies 
meant that public investment was channeled mainly toward infrastructure projects rather than 
industrial enterprises as in the past.34 Private investment was highly concentrated in housing, 
which was being subsidized through an EBF under the office of the prime minister. Exports also 
continued to be heavily subsidized, yet little private investment was attracted to the exporting 
sectors (Conway, 1990).35 The subsidies helped exports grow, but this was achieved through 
diversion from domestic markets, which raised domestic prices and contributed to inflation. On 
the import side, liberalizations in the first half of 1980s were partially reversed due to the 
proliferation of EBFs that heavily depended on import taxes for their budgets and were used for 
rewarding or punishing domestic producers (Celasun, 1994: 468). 
Increasing macroeconomic imbalances, partial reversal of trade liberalization, and hesitation of the 
private sector to invest under a pro-business government are reminiscent of the events in the 
1950s. In fact, in the 1980s businessmen complained about the same problems in their relation 
with the government that they had in the 1950s (Bugra, 1994). If one overlooks the combined 
role of electoral cycles and power concentration, this appears as a puzzle. Ozal's government had 
much clearer credentials of private-sector orientation than the DP government and dealt with a far 
more experienced and better-endowed private sector. Ozal had championed a liberalization 
program and many of those surrounding him, including the members of his cabinet, had links and 
past experiences in the private sector. Ozal himself had been a member of TUSIAD, had served 
as an executive officer at a private conglomerate, and had ties to the private sector (Arat, 1991). 
Thus, economic policies were expected to be supportive of the private sector and to boost 
growth through massive private investment. Indeed, business leaders welcomed Ozal's 
ascendancy to power and the government did offer incentives for the private sector (Arat, 1991). 
Nevertheless, private investors did not have sufficient confidence to commit their assets at a 
larger scale to the development of the Turkish economy. 
34 The importance of the private sector as a target of economic policy can be observed in the facts that at the same 
time that public expenditure was rising, the salaries of government employees and expenditures on items such as 
education and health were allowed to sharply decline in real terms. The shares these expenditure in GNP came 
down from 3.3 and 1.1% in 1980 to 2.4 and 0.6% in 1985, respectively (OECD, 1987: 54). 
35 Export incentives included tax rebates, duty-free imports, and credit subsidies. Tax rebates alone were quite 
substantial and at their peak in 1983 reached 22.3% of eligible exports and 14.2% of total exports (Onis, 1992). 
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The problem of Ozal's government was that it had too much discretion to resist the temptation of 
offering patronage to keep many individuals in the business community supportive.36 Yet, the 
private sector as a whole saw serious flaws in the policies and questioned their rationale and 
sustainability. "Even though individual entrepreneurs benefited from the system through personal 
ties, conditions favorable to private entrepreneurs [as a whole] could not be created" (Arat, 
1991). Many business groups that had supported the 1980 coup and the MP were alienated by 
the late 1980s as a result of "arbitrary" policies and the government's unresponsiveness to their 
demands (Bugra, 1994; Kalaycioglu, 1991). Even the beneficiaries could not be sure that the 
policies would continue and avoided committing their assets to the lines of production being 
promoted. Ozal was not oblivious to the policy problems, but could not commit the government 
to a more long-term approach. 
Turkey's privatization policy in the 1980s is also indicative of the government's preoccupation 
with short-run concerns at the cost of long-term efficiency. Privatization of a large part of the 
public sector was part of the 1980 reform program. The MP professed to be committed to the 
policy, but did not accomplish much while it was in power. As Kjellstrom (1990) suggests, the 
MP was interested in privatization not so much as a necessary step to improve productivity, but 
mainly as a means of generating current revenues for the government (see the Appendix). Policy 
uncertainty implied that for most public enterprises the offered prices could not be very high and 
the sale was not worthwhile. Widespread distribution of shares could have generated support for 
more favorable policies toward privatized units. But, that required selling a large part of the 
assets at a low price, which would defeat the government's purpose. 
Dissatisfaction with the MP's economic policies and the inflation and external debt it had created 
in the late 1980s manifested itself in a major setback for the MP in the local elections of 1989. 
After the elections, the government intensified its stabilization efforts. However, at that time the 
National Assembly elected Ozal as president and he resigned as the MP leader. The MP, which 
had been a loose coalition around Ozal soon displayed its cleavages and could not regain its unity. 
Two MP prime ministers served during 1990 and 1991 and finally early general elections had to 
be called. In these elections the MP did very poorly and captured only one fourth of the 
Assembly seats. Instead, Demirel's True Path Party (TPP), a reincarnation of the JP, won 40% 
of the seats and formed a coalition government with a center-left party. 
The 1989 stabilization policy entailed the repeal of export subsidies and retrenchments in public 
investment and expenditure, which brought economic growth and exports expansion to a halt. 
The economy briefly recovered in 1990 following a spurt in government expenditure. However, 
despite continued improvement in the external terms of trade, growth could not be sustained 
because of the large external debt and continuing high inflation. In 1991, the economy experienced 
another recession. 
36 For discussions on this issue, see Bugra (1994), Heper (1991c), Kalaycioglu (1991), and Sayari (1992). 
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8. MORE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In the early 1990s, the 1980 restrictions on political activity lost its impact on Turkey's political 
economy. The system's checks and balances strengthened and made policy change more difficult, 
although not nearly as much as in the pre-1980 system. In recent years, no party has obtained 
parliamentary majority and changing policies has required substantial coalition building. The 
reduced power of the executive also has reflected itself in the 1993 reincorporation of most EBFs 
in the regular government budget (Atiyas, 1994). This has been a mixed blessing because while 
the government has gained more commitment power, its ability to modify the inefficient and 
unsustainable policies it inherited from the experience of the 1980s has diminished. The task of 
putting macroeconomic, trade, and public enterprise reforms back on track has been monumental. 
Although progress toward reform has been slow, there have been positive achievements. In 1994 
the government started a major stabilization and liberalization effort and passed a massive 
privatization plan through by the National Assembly. These are more solid gains because 
reversing policies under the current political setup is far more difficult than under the situation in 
the 1980s. Indeed, private investors seem to have developed greater confidence in the current 
situation and have expanded their share of total investment from 42% in the 1980s to over 54%. 
However, as a result of the stabilization plan the moderate recovery experienced by the Turkish 
economy in 1992-93 has turned into a deep recession 1994 from which recovery has been slow. 
Nevertheless, the reforms may bear fruit if the system survives the current political and economic 
crisis. Given that the Turkish economy is now far more open and market based than in the 1960s 
and 1970s, it may greatly benefit from a combination of commitment and flexibility. 
A factor that makes the situation more hopeful is the prospects of Turkey's gradual integration 
into the European Union. This factor gives the government a strong incentive to pursue market- 
oriented reforms and makes reversal of such policies quite costly. Turkey expects to gain greatly 
from expanded relations with European economies and the requirements of integration act as 
guiding posts and discipline measures. This factor has been present for some time, but it has 
grown stronger in recent years as the stumbling blocks towards the formation of a customs union 
are being removed.37 
8. CONCLUSION 
The experience of Turkey and many other countries shows that robust economic performance 
requires institutions that commit the government to a long-term course of action. There are two 
types of political institutions that help mitigate the problem of confidence in the government. 
37 The application for full membership was actually filed in 1987 after the relations with the European Community 
had been frozen for nine years. But the Community's initial response made it clear that it "did not view Turkey as 
being ready to enter as a full member in the near future" (Steinbach, 1994). Since then, the prospects of a 
settlement in Cyprus have improved, which should reduce Greece's opposition to Turkey's membership. A 
number of measures have also been ratified in Turkey that satisfy the Union's demand, although some key issues 
remain unresolved-e.g., the question of human rights in Turkey, especially is the case of Kurdish population. 
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First, a setup whereby the same political party or group dominates the government and restricts 
competition such that it can expect to remain in power for the foreseeable future. In this case the 
reputation of the government for honoring its promises acts as a collateral for the commitment. 
Second, a setup in which power is diffuse and no individual or group can significantly influence 
government policies without the consent of many other interests. The first setup can offer 
flexibility in policymaking, but can fail badly when short-term exigencies overwhelm the long-run 
perspective of the regime or when, in the process of selecting the leadership, individuals with 
inappropriate skills rise to the top. The second setup reduces the role of individuals in policy 
making and in that sense can offer stronger commitment possibilities, but flexibility would be 
reduced. This disadvantage is less important when policies focus on the general rules of exchange 
rather than the details. In particular, if the government is committed to support private markets, 
rigidities in policymaking can be compensated by the flexibility of the economy, while 
commitment to extensive controls on markets can be quite costly, especially over longer terms 
when the circumstances change. 
The dilemma of many low-income countries is that their markets are too underdeveloped and the 
assets and skills of their private sectors are too limited to make commitment to private markets 
an attractive option when the government can achieve higher growth rates or secure stronger 
economic and political support for itself by extensive bureaucratic intervention. Indeed, the 
economy may be seen as too vulnerable to shocks if it is left to a weak private sector and, as a 
result, commitment to maintaining private markets may not be credible. Thus, striking a balance 
between commitment and flexibility in policymaking tends to be a more difficult problem in these 
countries. This can induce a dynamics in the institutional setup whereby the system moves 
between low and high commitment phases. The high commitment phases offer opportunities for 
growth, but end with a crisis when the leadership loses its reputation under the first type of 
institutional setup or policies fail to respond to changing circumstances under the second type. 
The resolution of such crises entails removal of the commitments. But low commitment phases 
fail to generate stable growth and induce a demand for stronger commitment. More stable 
institutions can emerge when the private sector is strong and offers the political leaders a reliable 
option relative to what they can gain through extensive bureaucratic operations in the economy. 
Knowledge of these dynamics and the underlying problems can be useful for the design of 
institutions when the opportunity arises. 
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APPENDIX: PRIVATIZATION POLICY SINCE 1980 
This appendix outlines the causes of failure in Turkey's privatization policy since 1980. The 
policy was an important part of the 1980 reform program, but was not taken up seriously until 
1986 and even then was pursued in a haphazard manner. 
Privatizing a substantial part of Turkey's extensive public sector was not expected to be an easy 
task. In particular, it was natural to expect political opposition to policy in an economy that had 
grown around the public sector for five decades. But, Ozal's government was in a strong position 
and, in fact, in 1984 the cabinet obtained authorization to decide on privatization of public 
enterprises without prior approval by the Assembly (Kjellstrom, 1990). Moreover, when the 
issue was expressed as distribution of shares to public enterprise workers, small savers, and the 
people in general, there was considerably less resistance in the polity. For this reason, early in 
the process, the government declared this method of privatization as the only permissible one. 
Also, the privatization law passed in 1986 assigned the task to the Mass Housing and Public 
Participation Administration (MHPPA), an extra-budgetary fund developed to manage revenue- 
sharing certificates for infrastructure projects and help subsidize private investment in housing. 
In the mid-1980s, the MHPPA had succeeded in selling fix-term revenue sharing certificates to 
finance the Bosphorus Bridge and the Keban Dam and the idea of selling public enterprise shares 
were seen as similar. 
Given the MP's large majority in the National Assembly, legislative resistance to privatization 
was quite weak. The privatization law essentially turned the policy into an administrative matter 
in which the prime minister had control over the entire process and retained a substantial part of 
the revenues for his discretionary expenditures. In particular, the law specified that an inter- 
ministerial committee chaired by the prime minister was responsible for identifying public 
enterprises that were candidates for sale. Such enterprises would be transferred as corporations 
to the MHPPA, which would act as a holding company and decide on the procedures for sale. 
The MHPPA was allowed to retain 30% of the proceeds for its own use. 
If the government's concern was building support for the privatization program and increasing the 
efficiency of the economy, it would have probably started with a number of relatively large 
companies with stable conditions, would have created institutional mechanisms for the new 
owners to install and monitor a management of their own, and would have underpriced the shares 
sold to small investors. Instead, the first test case offered to the public in February 1988 was 
Teletas, a relatively small telecommunications equipment company. The MHPPA sold the 
company's shares in small lots through branches of commercial banks, but the control of the 
management remained in the government's hands (Ilkin, 1994). Although the shares were fully 
subscribed and subsequently traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange, a great deal of uncertainty 
remained about the conditions of the firm. Shortly after the sales, the state-owned Post, 
Telephone and Telegraph Agency, the major customer of Teletas, announced a significant cutback 
in its investment program. This, together with a declining trend in the Turkish stock market, 
eroded half of Teletas's share value in a few months (Kjellstrom, 1990: 28). Subsequently, the 
government bought back some of the shares to prop up the price, which partially reversed the 
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process. But, the experience eroded the public's confidence in this method of privatization and 
the government decided to abandon the idea of widespread ownership for a while. 
The MHPPA soon shifted to the strategy of direct sales (Ilkin, 1994). In October 1988, the 
agency concluded a deal with Coca Cola company of the United States to sell the Ansa bottling 
company. This case went rather smoothly and did not stir up controversy because Ansa was a 
formerly bankrupt private firm that the government had been forced to take over. The 
government was encouraged that this method may be more effective than widespread domestic 
ownership and stepped up the direct sales to foreign investors. However, before long the 
opposition parties went to the administrative court and obtained a restraining order. It turned out 
that in a rush to sell the companies, the government had not canceled its initial decision on sales 
methods. Although eventually the government corrected the problem and made direct sales 
possible with another decree, this avenue of raising revenue proved problematic as well because 
the credibility of the government was in doubt and few further sales were made. 
In 1990, the MHPPA returned to widespread share sales through a commercial bank and Istanbul 
Stock Exchange, while pursuing direct sales whenever possible as well. However, this time the 
focus shifted to selling minority shares in public enterprises. The MHPPA also decided to 
support the price of shares it sold for some time after the sale. As a result, the process went 
more smoothly, but the volume of sales remained small and the impact on enterprise efficiency is 
uncertain. The justification for the government's hesitation to sell shares at a larger scale was that 
Turkey's capital market is shallow and cannot absorb large volumes (Waterbury, 1993: 152; 
Ilkin, 1994). But, this should not be a major concern if the goals of the reform are broader than 
financing the budget deficit. The reforms in the Czech Republic provide a clear example. The 
Turkish government, on the other hand, has displayed the dominance of its narrower concerns by 
its tendency to overprice the shares: For most partially privatized companies share prices have 
not kept up with the Istanbul Stock Exchange index since the date of issue. 
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Table 1 
Economic Performance in Turkey* 
Period Growth Gross Share of Inflation 
of GDP Investment- Private Sector in 
per-capita GDP Ratio Total Investment 
1924-29 5.0 12.3 74.0 1.2 
1930-33 3.7 8.5 56.5 -14.0 
1933-38 5.0 10.0 54.0 0.6 
1939-45 -9.0 9.5 60.0 25.0 
1946-50 11.0 9.5 n.a. -0.6 
1951-60 2.0 15.0 54.0 10.9 
1961-72 4.0 18.5 51.4 7.0 
1973-77 5.0 21.7 51.6 20.0 
1978-80 -1.4 19.9 45.2 69.2 
1981-83 1.8 20.9 44.5 33.0 
1984-89 3.0 22.8 42.1 51.0 
1990-92 2.8 21.4 54.2 63.0 
* The data given in this table are approximate figures for the dates shown. All figures are in 
percentage terms. 
n.a. Not Available. 
Sources: Hansen (1991), Onis and Riedel (1993), World Tables (1993). 
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